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Reconsidering Plaintiff's Fault in
Product Liability Litigation: The




The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was ap-
proved by the Commissioners in 1977. Dean John W. Wade was
Chairman of the special committee that drafted the Act. The Act
is a comparative-fault, rather than a comparative-negligence, act;
it applies to all nonintentional torts, including products liability
actions, whether they are based on negligence, breach of warranty,
or strict tort liability.1 The Act seeks to address the problem of the
relationship between the doctrines of comparative negligence and
strict liability for products by permitting plaintiff's fault to effect a
proportional reduction in any recovery. There are questions, how-
ever, of whether comparative negligence or the several common-law
defenses that have developed for strict liability claims should apply
at all to a strict liability action.
The Act, by adopting the pure form of comparative fault,
would permit the manufacturer of a defective product to reduce his
financial liability for injuries caused by a defective product by that
percentage of the total fault attributable to the claimant's unrea-
sonable conduct. Prior to the Act several states had adopted com-
parative fault statutes that expressly apply to a cause of action not
based solely on a defendant's negligence. 2 Courts, however, did not
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist School of Law. B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971,
University of Illinois.
1. UNIFORM CbMPARATIVE FAULT ACr § 1. The Act and comments to the Act have been
included in an Appendix to a fine article analyzing its provisions by Dean John Wade. See J.
Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29
MERCER L. Rv. 373 (1978).
2. Conn. Pub. Act No. 77-335 (1977); N a. Rav. STAT. § 25-1151 (Supp. 1978); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. § 1411 (1976).
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begin to vigorously apply the principles of comparative responsibil-
ity until the Florida Supreme Court judicially adopted comparative
negligence in 1973 and subsequently applied comparative responsi-
bility principles to the strict liability action.' More recently, the
Model Uniform Products Liability Act, using as its model the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, adopts the principles of comparative
responsibility to govern a products liability claim.4 The trend to-
ward utilization of comparative responsibility principles is in-
tended to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine that a claimant's
unreasonable assumption of the risk or unforeseeable misuse of a
product constitutes an absolute defense to all types of product de-
fect actions. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, however, ex-
tends beyond the utilization of "fault" apportionment to compro-
mise difficult cause-in-fact problems. All forms of fault chargeable
to the plaintiff, including negligence, recklessness, unreasonable as-
sumption of risk, misuse of or failure to inspect a product, or un-
reasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages act to
diminish his recovery in all forms of nonintentional fault-based
actions.
The fashionability of comparative responsibility principles as a
dominant theme in tort reform is reflected in the willingness of
courts to determine that liability for product defect is subject to
apportionment. This doctrine reflects an attitude that percentage
3. The Florida Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The principles of Hoffman were applied to a strict liability action
in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). See also Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). But see Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534
F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). See
generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972). Many jurisdictions have interpreted the compara-
tive fault statutes broadly to include comparative fault defenses in a products liability ac-
tion. See, e.g., Buscl! v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Although the Texas legislature had adopted a
modified comparative negligence statute, the Texas Supreme Court declined to adopt the
modified form of comparative fault, adopting instead a pure form for a strict liability action.
See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See also Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
4. The text and commentary of the Model Act may be found at 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(1979). The Model Act at § 111 provides:
(A) Comparative Responsibility. All claims under this Act shall be governed by the
principles of comparative responsibility. In any claim under this Act, the comparative
responsibility of, or attributed to the claimant shall not bar recovery but shall diminish
the award of compensatory damages proportionately, according to the measure of re-
sponsibility attributed to the claimant.
44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734.
[Vol. 33:651
DESIGN CHOICE EXCEPTION
comparisons are a more equitable means of finding justice.' As one
court noted:
[O]ur reason for extending a full system of comparative fault to strict prod-
ucts liability is because it is fair to do so. The law consistently seeks to ele-
vate justice and equity above the exact contours of a mathematical equation.
We are convinced that in merging the two principles what may be lost in
symmetry is more than gained in fundamental fairness.'
The decision of the courts and some legislatures to opt for a
distinct doctrine of comparative fault in products liability cases
provides a mechanism for examining the role of plaintiff's conduct
with regard to maintaining product integrity. This author, how-
ever, agrees with the position adopted by Professor Aaron Twerski
that indiscriminate use of the comparative fault doctrine will par-
tially negate the imposition of duties that the law has placed on
manufacturing defendants.'
Twerski's thesis is that comparative responsibility should ap-
ply only if the plaintiff had a role to perform in maintaining prod-
uct safety.8 It is this author's position, however, that basic tort
goals should dominate the doctrine of strict liability. Furthermore,
the primary goal of tort liability, that of achieving a reduction in
the number of injuries, is often not obtained by a consideration of
plaintiff's fault. Accordingly, plaintiffs fault should not be a de-
fense, nor should the principles of comparative responsibility ap-
ply, in cases in which the product is "defective" due to the exis-
tence of a conscious design choice. In order to present the thesis
underlying this criticism of the total adoption of comparative fault
principles to the products liability cause of action, it will be neces-
sary to review the different categories of product defect as well as
the nature of a claimant's conduct as a defense.
5. See, e.g., Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. Am L. &
CoM. 107 (1976); Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contribution, and Equal
Protection in the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10 IND. L. REv.
831 (1977); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171
(1974); Wade, supra note 1. But see Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence
in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797 (1977).
6. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
7. See Twerski, supra note 5, at 821.
8. Professor Twerski would not permit a claimant's conduct, whether reasonable or
unreasonable, to constitute a proportional defense to a strict liability action unless the
claimant had a "role to fulfill in maintaining [the] product safety." See id. at 821. I agree
with Professor Twerski's fundamental assumption that indiscriminate application of com-
parative fault is inappropriate, but I would focus instead on the nature of product defect
with the goal of reducing, through effective application of deterrence principles, the overall
risks of injury from defective manufactured products.
1980]
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II. CATEGORIES OF DEFECT
A fundamental premise underlying the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity, as opposed to the concept of absolute liability, is the require-
ment that in order to establish a prima facie case, the claimant
must prove that the product involved fell below the standard of
care set for that type of product.' This requirement is normally sat-
isfied by establishing that the product contained a defect that ren-
dered it "unreasonably dangerous." In addition, it must be proven
that the alleged defect actually caused the injuries for which the
claimant seeks recovery. If the claimant fails to prove the product
was defective or to make the requisite causal link, there may be no
recovery even though the claimant suffered injuries as a result of
using the product and has not himself been "at fault."
Describing the parameters of the standard for determining a
prima facie case of strict liability has been the subject of considera-
ble controversy." Although there is no consensus," this standard
will generally be met if the product contains a "defect '" 2 that ren-
ders it "unreasonably dangerous." 3 The defect that renders the
product "unreasonably dangerous" may be either a manufacturing
flaw" or a product design defect." A manufacturing flaw involves
an unexpected and unintended deviation from the manufacturer's
design specifications, performance standards, or expectations de-
rived from the use of otherwise identical units of the same product
line. Included within the category of product design defects are
9. See Caplaco One, Inc. v. Amerex Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1116 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Hoffoss
v. Ralston Purina Co., 341 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
10. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. Rav. 643 (1978); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30 (1973); Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L.
Ray. 293 (1975); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973); Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: "Rea-
sonableness" Revisited?, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 705 (1979).
11. See Walkowiak, supra note 10, at 713-37.
12. But see Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978), in which the
court held that if the product that caused claimant's injury was "unreasonably dangerous in
normal use," the claimant need not also establish that the product deviated from any other
standard. See also Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
Cf. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 19 Wash. App. 515, 576 P.2d 426 (1978) (defective
condition and unreasonably dangerous are essentially synonymous).
13. But see Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
14. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUcT LuBrxy AcT § 104A, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721.
15. See Walkowiak, supra note 10, at 721-37. For a criticism of the adversary system's
ability to define a system for evaluating "defect," see Henderson, Judicial Review of Manu-




products whose characteristics fail to warn adequately potential
users of dangers presented by foreseeable use of the product., The
failure of the manufacturer to include safety devices to protect
from injuries that may be caused by foreseeable use of the product
also results in strict liability.17 Strict liability may also be imposed
even though the manufacturer did not intend the product to be
used in a particular fashion. Thus, the manufacturer may still be
liable for injuries caused by a product if the misuse was so foresee-
able as to impose the duty to provide safety features or warnings
necessary to minimize the risk of injury.
18
The nature of the defect alleged to be contained in the manu-
facturer's product should determine whether the manufacturer can
be held responsible for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. An in-
advertent design defect may be a design or material choice, involv-
ing an unanticipated risk of injury in the foreseeable use of the
product, that may be proven by an objective standard. In the case
of an inadvertent design defect, the same standards may be uti-
16. See Embry v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ariz. 433, 565 P.2d 1294 (1977); Herman
v. Midland AG Serv., Inc., 200 Neb. 356, 264 N.W.2d 161 (1978); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton
Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
17. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Cepeda v. Cum-
berland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
18. The concept of intended use as a limitation on the manufacturer's liability was
best articulated in Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967). In
Pruitt, however, the manufacturer's product was not defective for failure to contain a warn-
ing because the manufacturer could not foresee the use of the product by the class of persons
who were suing for compensation. Id. at 857. As Dean Wade has pointed out, the product
may not be defective if the use is unforeseeable:
A manufacturer is under a duty to make his product reasonably safe not only for the
precise purpose for which it was sold but also for other purposes to which he might
reasonably anticipate that it would be put. If he meets this duty and makes the product
reasonably safe for these purposes, then he is not liable. The fact that the buyer has
taken the product and put it to an unforeseeable use cannot have the effect of broaden-
ing the manufacturer's duty and making him liable to the buyer for damages, even
though they are reduced in amount. The duty not being breached because the product
is not dangerously defective, there is no recovery.
Wade, supra note 1, at 384. With this statement I am wholely in accord. Thus, I would
distinguish "misuse" of a product from plaintiff's fault in determining whether the product
was defective. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, however, would not allow such a dis-
tinction. Thus, in Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976), the defendant manu-
factured a defective gas switch on a water heater that permitted gas to build up to a danger-
ously high level in the area. A repairman, called to investigate the incident, told the
homeowner to take her child from the area as a safety precaution. He returned, however, and
was injured when the gas flowed toward an open flame. The risk to be prevented by the
proper manufacture of the safety valve was prevention of high gas concentration, exactly the
risk which caused injury. The repairman, however, was on notice of a gas leak and yet volun-
tarily encountered that risk. In this type situation, when plaintiff's conduct is unrelated to
the proof of defect, I would not reduce plaintiffs recovery due to such conduct.
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lized as for a manufacturing flaw. Unanticipated problems with the
manufacturer's objectives or expectations in choosing a particular
design or in manufacturing a product that deviated from the man-
ufacturer's own design or performance specifications make it un-
likely that the manufacturer would have marketed the product had
he been aware of the manufacturing flaw or inadvertent design er-
ror. This theory of strict liability has as its conceptual base the
desirability of secondary loss distribution due to the manufac-
turer's superior ability to spread the costs of the injuries suffered
by product users, combined with a determination of "fault."'" The
"imputed knowledge" test can thus- define the standard of care for
strict liability in both the manufacturing flaw and inadvertent de-
sign defect cases. For example, an automobile, that due to an in-
advertent design choice has the tendency to accelerate because of a
misdesigned fuel system and therefore creates a possibility of in-
jury,2" is as defective as if the metal of which the auto was cast
contained an excessive amount of impurities.2 In neither case
would the manufacturer have released the product into commerce
if he had known of the defect.
A second category of design defects, however, involves con-
scious design choice, which is directly related to the function of the
product. In making design choices the manufacturer understands
that there are risks of injury linked to the intended design, but con-
cludes that these risks are overshadowed by the increased benefits
or reduced costs that flow from the chosen design. The conscious
design choice case presents the greatest difficulty for commentators
and courts alike, since it is, in effect, the substitution of a court
imposed judgment in place of the "reasonable care" negligence
standard to measure the conduct of the manufacturer's design en-
gineers. 22 Thus, while a determination of the traditional manufac-
turing flaw case can be resolved by an objective comparison of the
"defective" product to the manufacturer's intentions, liability is
imposed in a conscious design choice case if the social costs of the
"unreasonable design" outweigh the "reasonable" evaluation of rel-
ative costs and benefits.
19. As Dean Wade has stated:
In the case of products liability, the fault inheres primarily in the nature of the
product. The product is "bad" because it is not duly safe; it is determined to be defec-
tive and (in most jurisdictions) unreasonably dangerous.
Wade, supra note 1, at 377 (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1978).
21. E.g., Browder v. Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. 1976).
22. See Walkowiak, supra note 10, at 722-23.
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III. THE IMPOSITION OF STRICT LIABILITY IN DEFECT CASES
The famous English case of Vaughan v. Menlove23 set forth the
standard by which a defendant's conduct would be measured in
order to determine if the defendant had been negligent. In
Vaughan, the court held the defendant to the standard of the rea-
sonable person, regardless of whether the particular defendant be-
ing sued had acted in good faith. Indeed, that is the standard to
which a defendant is held even though he may not be capable of
achieving that standard of care. Vaughan articulated as a mini-
mum an objective standard which might have borne little relation-
ship to the attributes of a particular defendant. 24 As between a de-
fendant who had fallen below this standard and a claimant who
had suffered injuries as a result of the defendant's failure to mea-
sure up to the minimum standard of care, the effect of Vaughan is
to shift the burden of compensating for the claimant's injuries to
the defendant. Similarly, strict liability for a manufacturing flaw
in the product also establishes an objective standard through which
liability may be imposed upon a manufacturer who has acted in
good faith and exercised reasonable (or even utmost) care.2 In a
manufacturing flaw case, it must be established that the defect ex-
isted at the time of manufacture and that the defect was a cause of
the claimant's injuries. In formulating a standard by which to mea-
sure what constitutes a defect in a product, some courts have re-
sorted to familiar negligence language.
By reference to the traditional negligence standard, the fact
finder in a manufacturing flaw case must determine not only that
23. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
24. See id. As Dean Wade has stated in his analysis of the standard of care:
[T]he landmark case of Vaughan v. Menlove established that the standard to be ap-
plied was an objective one. The question was not whether the defendant "had acted
honestly and bona fide to the best of his own judgment," but whether he had acted
with a measure of "caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe." If this
imposed a higher standard than he was capable of attaining, he was still liable.
Wade, supra note 1, at 376.
25. In this respect, then, there is both similarity and dissimilarity between strict liabil-
ity and liability based upon negligence. Neither requires evidence that the defendant was
subjectively aware of a deviation from an established standard. In negligence, however, the
theoretical focus is upon the conduct of the defendant, whereas in strict liability the focus of
the analysis is upon the product to determine if it fell below a minimum standard of accept-
able safety. Since reduction of the total number of injuries through the imposition of
financial liability is a goal of tort law, both strict liability and negligence should have an
element of deterrence as one of the goals of imposing liability. It is only conduct that can be
deterred. The conduct, however defined, of the parties who are in the best position to reduce




the product involved falls below the contemplated standard, but
also that the product is "unreasonably dangerous" because of the
defect."6 An unreasonably dangerous product may be defined as an
article which a reasonable person would not place in the stream of
commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character.27 Thus, one
of the principal elements of negligence liability for the manufacture
of a defective product, imputation of knowledge, is eliminated. In-
stead of requiring, as would be true in a typical negligence action,
that the plaintiff prove the manufacturer "knew or should have
known" of the defect in the exercise of reasonable care, knowledge
is imputed to the manufacturer -for purposes of determining
whether the product is defective.2s Foreseeability as a test for deter-
mining whether the product is defective is also eliminated under
the doctrine of strict liability. That is, the reasonable manufacturer
need not have foreseen that the manufactured product would result
in the claimant's injury in order for the claimant to establish that
the product is defective.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, upon
which many courts relied in establishing a system of strict liability
for products, went one step further in developing a standard to
which the manufacturer would be liable for product-related inju-
ries. Under the Restatement, the manufacturer could not rely upon
the user's failure to discover the defect in order to absolve himself
of liability.29 Thus, liability can be imposed under section 402A
26. But see note 13 supra. The court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff prove
that the product contained a defect and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous, since the concept of unreasonable danger rang of negligence, an element that
strict liability was intended to eliminate. It was sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the
product was defective. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
27. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), in which
the court stated: "A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable person
would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character.
The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of
the risk involved." Id. at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036 (footnotes omitted).
28. As Dean Wade succinctly stated this proposition:
The time has come to be forthright in using a tort way of thinking and tort termi-
nology [in cases of strict liability in tort]. There are several ways of doing it, and it is
not difficult. The simplest and easiest way, it would seem, is to assume that the defen-
dant knew of the dangerous condition of the product and ask whether he was then
negligent in putting it on the market or supplying it to someone else. In other words,
the scienter is supplied as a matter of law, and there is no need for the plaintiff to prove
its existence as a matter of fact.
Wade, supra note 10, at 834-35. See also Walkowiak, supra note 10, at 714-16.
29. This section provides in relevant part that "[O]ne who sells any product in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. . . or to his property is subject to liabil-
[Vol. 33:651
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even if the plaintiff's failure to inspect might have constituted a
defense in a negligence action.
This standard of liability reflects a consumer oriented attitude
regarding the role that strict liability for product defect should play
in the overall scheme of secondary loss distribution and primary
loss deterrence. Strict liability is not a form of absolute liability for
product-caused injuries. Instead, it merely sets a minimum stan-
dard for product manufacture. If a manufacturer's product falls be-
low the standard, the manufacturer will be assessed for all injuries
caused by the defect. The decision to opt for strict liability thus
reflects the attitude that manufacturers should be liable for inju-
ries associated with products because they are better able both to
limit the number of injuries and, more importantly, to allocate
losses.
The application of this form of strict liability to product de-
fects causes little difficulty in the case of an inadvertent design er-
ror. Such cases are governed by the rationale stated by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.3" The court in
Kimwood advocated use of the "unreasonably dangerous" proof re-
quirement by noting that "[a] dangerously defective article would
be one which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of
commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character. 31 The test
for determining strict liability, therefore, is whether the manufac-
turer would be negligent if he had known of the risks involved in
either (a) releasing into commerce the product with the manufac-
turing flaw, or (b) releasing into commerce the product with an in-
advertent design defect. It was, therefore, totally predictable that
in such cases courts would attempt to unify the definition of defect
and "unreasonable danger" in a single element. Since the use of
the negligence based standard implies an element of unreasonable-
ness of risk, it is also not surprising that some courts equated the
notion of strict liability for manufacturing error to negligence per
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The comments to this section provide:
Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this section deals is not based
upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability
cases . . . applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n, at 356 (1965). See generally Noel,
Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25
VAND. L. REv. 93, 106 (1972).
30. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); see note 27 supra.
31. Id. at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036.
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se.32 The actual revolution in the products liability field occurred
when the concept of strict liability for product defect was applied
to a product containing a conscious design choice.
In a conscious design choice case, the manufacturer may be
responsible to the injured party for negligence if the design decision
is unreasonable or in strict liability if the product design fails to
meet the minimum legal standard. The manufacturer may still be
liable, however, if the manufacturer fails to provide proper warn-
ings or safeguards on an otherwise nondefective product.3 3 The
definition of the standard for strict product liability includes pro-
tection from unreasonable risk of injury, however that risk is
created.34 Thus, when a jury is instructed that in order to find
liability they must first determine that the product contains a
"defect," it should be recognized that the existence vel non of the
term "defect" implies in common parlance that the manufacturer
has deviated from a standard set for the product.35
The factors that should be employed to determine whether the
manufacturer's "reasonable decision" has nonetheless resulted in
the creation of a defectively designed product have been the sub-
ject of considerable debate. Perhaps the most widely cited are the
seven criteria compiled by Dean Wade .3  However, whether these
32. See, e.g., Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978); Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
33. Stated very generally, the conclusion is that the manufacturer is in the best posi-
tion to make a determination of the risks presented by foreseeable use of his product and the
requisite precautions to be taken to prevent unreasonable injuries from those risks. The
manufacturer is not an absolute insurer of all injuries that are suffered by product users, but
only for those injuries that product users of "defective" products suffer. Since the manufac-
turer is in the best position to perform this cost-benefit analysis, the manufacturer should be
liable for all injuries from conscious design choice caused defects regardless of whether the
analysis is performed. Since the manufacturer can make the economic decision to market
the product in its present condition and risk current damages or invest in further research to
"prevent" those risks of injuries, they should bear the burden of financial liability even if
that research is unperformed. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1071 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1978); Chappuis v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978). As has been stated by one court:
[T]he test of the necessity of warnings or instructions is not to be governed by the
reasonable man standard. In the strict liability context we reject standards based upon
what the "reasonable" consumer could be expected to know, or what the "reasonable"
manufacturer could be expected to "foresee" about the consumers who use his product.
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 101, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975) (emphasis
added). See generally 2 L. FRu mR & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABuLITY, § 16[4][fI[vi] at 38-
140 (1979).
35. See note 11 supra.
36. Wade, supra note 10, at 837-38.
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factors or some other test is employed, 3 the critical issue to be con-
sidered is whether the replacement of the manufacturer's decisions
with those of the fact finder through application of these standards
will result in a system of liability for product defect that is consis-
tent with the other public policy goals that have been established
expressly or implicitly in the adversarial system of liability
distribution.
IV. PRIMARY Loss REDUCTION AND SECONDARY Loss DISTRIBUTION
One role for a system of strict liability is to present a frame-
work within which the decision may be made to compensate claim-
ants for injuries caused by a breach of a standard of care. Society
undertakes to establish a standard of care by determining the
proper allocation of the costs of certain activities. There are two
goals to fulfill in setting the standard for imposition of liability
through a private tort action. The first goal, primary loss reduc-
tion, is intended to cause a total reduction in the number of injury-
producing incidents that are the logical consequence of "faulty"
conduct.s The second goal, secondary loss distribution, promotes
an allocation of the costs of compensating for losses caused by
fault-related conduct in the most economically efficient fashion." If
strict liability for product defect is intended to fulfill its role within
the overall scheme of tort loss distribution, then its role must be
described within those parameters. An undisciplined approach that
fails to rationally allocate product related loss to the manufacturer
(and therefore, to the purchasers of subsequent products through
price increases) would defeat the primary loss reduction goal of a
fault based liability system."
37. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
38. If the parties participating in an activity who are in the best position to reduce or
eliminate the number of injuries caused by that activity are deterred from conducting them-
selves in a manner that falls below the standard of care for that activity, total losses from
injuries suffered by persons injured by that activity will be reduced. This deterrence of con-
duct regulation effect is accomplished through the imposition of financial liability. See
Walkowiak, supra note 10, at 710. In strict liability for product defect, it is the manufacturer
of the product who is in the best position to reduce the risks of injury.
39. Once the decision is made to compensate for injuries, the most economically effi-
cient vehicle for compensating for those injuries should be utilized. That vehicle, however,
must be consistent with the first goal of loss deterrence. See Walkowiak, supra note 10, at
711, 740-44.
40. If losses for which there is no deterrence value are compensated through a system
as economically inefficient as the tort liability system, there will be little if any incentive on
the part of individuals or corporate tortfeasors to effect an overall reduction in losses.
Rather, as may be more politically and economically efficient, a reduction in deterrent val-
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Several factors are influential in the determination of financial
responsibility for the violation of a standard of care. The case of
Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co.4" illustrates that the use to which a
product is put by the plaintiff is relevant to the determination of
whether that product is defective. The plaintiff in Olson was in-
jured while applying the defendant's belt dressing product to a
conveyor belt at the pinch point between the conveyor belt and the
belt's power pulley. The plaintiff was responsible for maintaining
the conveyor belt, which was employed to move sand at an airport
construction site.42 On the day of the accident, the belt began slip-
ping. Neither lightening the load on -the belt nor tightening the belt
proved effective in curing the slippage. The plaintiff applied the
defendant's belt dressing product to the power pulley, which af-
forded temporary relief. After the belt began to slip again, the
plaintiff reapplied the dressing, again with satisfactory results.
During the third application, however, the plaintiff's hand was
caught in the pinch point causing serious injuries. At the time of
the third application the belt was completely stalled. Plaintiff al-
leged that the product was defective because the product label did
not adequately warn the plaintiff of the potential danger of using
the product. The defendant contended that the product was not
defective since the possibility of danger was obvious. 3
The Olson court sustained the jury's determination that the
product was defective and that this defect rendered the product
unreasonably dangerous. In rejecting the defendant's contention
that the obviousness of the danger constituted a sufficient response
to the allegation that the product was defective, the court quoted
with approval Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc." on the effect of an
obvious danger in an action based on negligence:
It seems to us that a rule which excludes the manufacturer from liability if
the defect in the design of his product is patent but applies the duty if such a
defect is latent is somewhat anomalous. The manufacturer of the obviously
ued losses as well as nondeterrent valued losses will be effected with more salutatory (to the
loss distributors) results. See, e.g., AETNA LiFE & CASuALTY, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, at 6-10.
41. 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
42. Id. at 533.
43. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff assumed the risk and that the product
was misused since the directions explicitly stated that the dressing should be applied solely
to moving belts. As to misuse, the court found that the misuse was not only foreseeable but
was the expected result of the use of the product under the circumstances. "When a manu-
facturer places upon the market a product designed to end belt slippage, it must reasonably
foresee that an ultimate consumer would not discontinue use of the product simply because
the belt slippage has deteriorated into total belt stoppage." Id. at 535.
44. 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
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defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a
bad one. The law, we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than en-
courage it in its obvious form. 5
The Olson court insisted that the obviousness of the danger did not
automatically preclude liability for the manufacture of a defective
product. Indeed, the manufacturer, having knowingly produced a
product with a dangerous potential, was burdened with special re-
sponsibilities." The duty that the manufacturer owed was the duty
to warn potential users of the risks of use of its product.
The Olson court then proceeded to review the defendant's alle-
gation that the plaintiff had voluntarily and unreasonably assumed
the risk of a known danger.47 That is, the court reviewed the evi-
dence to determine whether the defect was the actual cause of the
claimant's injury. The court stated that the definition of "defect"
was such that the claimant's knowledge of the possible risk in-
volved could absolve the manufacturer of liability for the existence
of the defect. The court found that the obviousness of the danger
presented by this product was something that the jury could con-
sider in determining whether the plaintiff "knowingly" and unrea-
sonably encountered a risk.
The jury could thus consider that the product was defective
and that this defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous
even though the danger was obvious. In addition, the jury was in-
structed to evaluate the obviousness of the danger in its determina-
tion of whether the plaintiff unreasonably assumed the risk of a
known danger. In this fashion, the "obviousness" of the risk of us-
ing a product that lacked an appropriate warning was presented to
the jury for their consideration twice. First, a determination of
whether the product fell below the accepted standard was made.
That is, the plaintiff had to establish not only that the product was
defective, but also that the defect rendered the product unreasona-
bly dangerous and resulted in the claimant's injuries. The second
consideration was whether, even if the product was defective and
unreasonably dangerous, the plaintiff had unreasonably assumed a
known risk. In the context of an Olson situation this element is
merely another attack on causation."
45. Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 718-19.
46. 256 N.W.2d at 537.
47. Id. at 538.
48. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 357, 540 P.2d 835,
837 (1975), in which the court held that negligence of the plaintiff that concurs with defect of
the product is no defense. For a discussion of the misuse defense as an elemention of causation
in the plaintiff's case in chief, see Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Injury Into the
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In this type of conscious design choice case, once the plaintiff
succeeds in establishing that the defendant's product is defective,
that the defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous, and
that the defect caused injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiffs conduct
should not present an absolute or proportional bar to the plaintiff's
recovery. The duty of the manufacturer to warn should not be sub-
ject to double attack. If the product is defective because it does not
contain a proper warning, and that defect caused the claimant's
injury, the manufacturer's duty to the claimant has been breached.
It is therefore inconsistent that the claimant's assumption of that
risk may be a bar to recovery.49 In this respect, since the fundamen-
tal underpinnings of strict liability lie in primary loss reduction,
attention should be given to imposing liability on the party in the
best position to reduce or eliminate primary losses. It is incongru-
ous to suggest that a plaintiff, undeterred by the risk of serious
injuries to himself, would nevertheless be deterred by the probabil-
istic reduction in financial compensation inherent in a comparative
Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERcER L. Rav. 403, 419-20 (1978).
49. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 90 N.M. 414, 417, 564 P.2d 619,
621 (N.M. 1977) (holding that if product defect and concurring negligence of the plaintiff
cause injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's conduct does not constitute a defense). See also
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 457, 242 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1978). In the context of a
negligent failure to warn situation, this proposition has been stated as follows:
To allow [plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of risk as] defenses is to
indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed
a risk of which he was ignorant or to have contributed to his own injury when he had no
way of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed. On the other hand, if
the plaintiff knew of the danger from an independent source, the manufacturer's failure
to warn would'not be the proximate cause of the injury.
Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. Rzv.
145, 163 (1955>. A slightly different result, one more compatible with the ideas expressed in
this article, was reached in Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d
627 (1959). In Comstock, the plaintiff, an employee of a car dealership, was injured when he
was struck by an automobile driven by the service manager. The car had been brought in for
servicing as the brakes had failed due to a defective "0" ring sealer. Although there was an
issue presented as to whether the defendant had been negligent in the manufacture of the
vehicle, the focus of the case was whether the defendant's negligent failure to warn could
constitute the basis of plaintiff's claim for injuries or whether it was no longer a cause of
plaintiff's injuries due to the superseding negligence of the service manager who had oper-
ated the car in a negligent fashion with notice (provided by the owner) of the failure of the
brakes on the car. The court concluded that the foreseeable risk of injuries that could occur
from the defendant's failure to warn potential users was that the car might injure someone
when driven. Thus, the focus of the court's attention is placed correctly, I believe, on the
total risk to be controlled. Since the risk sought to be controlled was the risk of injury due to
the defendant's failure to warn users, the acts of individuals whose conduct combines with
the defendant to cause injury should not cut off the liability of the party who has breached
his duty. This should be true in strict liability although that person is the claimant if the
manufacturer's duty has been breached.
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fault system. 0
Consideration of a defendant's duty and the effect of plaintiff's
fault upon that duty in a more familiar context may be helpful.
The circumstances and nature of plaintiff "fault" illustrate the
artificiality of the deterrence value in those cases in which it has
been a defense. Several courts have attempted to analogize strict
liability to negligence per se in order to apply a comparative negli-
gence statute or rule. 5' This analogy is not without merit. It is
sound when the statute that constitutes the basic standard of care
in the action has as its goal the protection of parties from their own
negligence. For example, a reasonable description of liability for vi-
olation of a statute that anticipates the plaintiff's negligence is
found in Scott v. Independent School District No. 709.51
In Scott, the plaintiff was a thirteen year old seventh grade
student who sued his school after being injured when a drill bit
broke off and embedded in his eye during a classroom exercise. He
was not wearing safety goggles although a state statute required
that goggles be worn. A pair of goggles had, however, been assigned
to him at the beginning of the school year, and he had been in-
structed to wear them. 3 The court recognized that a claimant's
contributory negligence might constitute a defense in a negligence
per se action; the court stated, however, that plaintiff's fault would
not be a defense if the legislative intent behind the statute was to
protect the claimant from his own inexperience, lack of judgment,
inability to resist pressure, or tendency toward negligence.54
50. See note 3 supra.
51. It should be noted that the ideas presented in this paper are not inconsistent with
the construction placed upon a particular jurisdiction's comparative fault statute except in-
sofar as the courts have construed the legislature's intent to permit the plaintiff's fault to
constitute a proportional defense to a cause of action for personal injuries for a claim based
upon strict liability for a conscious design choice decision. This will require a retreat from
the position taken insofar as conscious design choice cases are concerned. See Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). When, however, the legislature has particu-
larly addressed the problem, a legislative change will be necessary. See IND. CODE § 33-1-1.
5-4 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-B-4 (1979).
52. 256 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 1977).
53. The statute provided as follows:
Every person shall wear industrial quality eye protective devices when participating in,
observing or performing any function in connection with, any courses or activities tak-
ing place in eye protection areas . . . of any school, college, university or other educa-
tional institution in the state.
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 126.20[1] (1979).
54. 256 N.W.2d at 488-89. Dean Wade, in his article advocating the adoption of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, acknowledges the negligence per se exception to the con-
tributory negligence defense. He goes on, however, to note that comparative negligence prin-
ciples may be consistent with this exception by reducing the recovery of the plaintiff. The
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The Scott court, in determining whether the plaintiff's fault
should constitute a bar, looked to the character of the social prob-
lem that the statute intended to address and the particular hazard
intended to be eliminated. The defendant argued that applying the
statute as the trial court did effectively imposed absolute liability
upon it. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, noted that the
statute imposed a duty upon the defendant to enforce reasonable
precautions to insure that safety goggles were worn by students.
The defendant's failure to do so would thus constitute negligence.
Furthermore, liability could not be abrogated by the failure of the
plaintiff to protect himself from the precise risk that the legislature
had intended that the defendant prevent. If, however, the defen-
dant took reasonable precautions to enforce the statute and the
plaintiff nevertheless failed to wear the safety goggles, the court
indicated that the defendant could not be found liable for the
plaintiff's injuries since the defendant had not breached his duty to
the plaintiff.
Comparison of this type of negligence per se action to the
products liability action for strict liability for conscious design
choice offers interesting parallels. There is some appeal to the pro-
position that the "fault" of the manufacturer in manufacturing a
defective product should be weighed against the "fault" of the user
in arriving at a fair allocation of the costs of the injury suffered by
the plaintiff. This requires a finding that both parties breached a
standard of care which each owed causing a-single indivisible in-
jury. By establishing a standard of care, total injuries will be re-
duced by deterring parties from falling below that standard. In a
strict product liability action in which the product is defective due
to an unconscious design defect or a manufacturing flaw, the deter-
rence aspect of financial liability for injuries not caused through
the attributed fault of the plaintiff may be sufficient to satisfy ba-
sic tort goals of secondary loss distribution since in this "pure"
form of strict liability the deterrence value upon the manufacturer
is minimal. When a conscious design choice case is being litigated,
however, the role of deterrence should be a principal concern. In
need for protection of the member of the class should also be considered in establishing their
proportion of fault. The comparative negligence rule may be applied if consistent with the
statutory intent of the legislature. Wade, supra note 1, at 386-87. The state of Minnesota
had a comparative negligence statute in effect at the time that Scott was decided; the court,
however, did not apply the statute since the plaintiff could not establish that the defendant
breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff. If, however, the plaintiff were to estab-
lish that fact, the defendant would not be permitted to rely upon the plaintiff's contributory
negligence as a defense.
(Vol. 33:651
DESIGN CHOICE EXCEPTION
such a case, the product is found defective because the manufac-
turer has adopted a design "knowing" it may cause injury or be-
cause it fails to contain an appropriate warning or a safety guard
that will protect the user from his own lack of judgment. 5 Thus, in
those instances in which the defect was the failure to contain an
appropriate warning or safety guard the court is holding in essence
that the manufacturer should protect the plaintiff from his own ig-
norance or lack of judgment. In other types of conscious design
choice actions the liability of the manufacturer is limited to the
risks of injuries that were accepted as being the costs of the adop-
tion of that particular design. The manufacturer is in the best posi-
tion to evaluate the risk of loss and to conduct a cost benefit analy-
sis to determine whether to incorporate various design alternatives;
therefore, the manufacturer is in the best position to effect a total
reduction in primary losses. If the risk of injury is not one caused
by such a design choice, then there will be no liability since there
will have been no breach of duty.
The question yet to be addressed is how to best accomplish the
goal of reducing total primary losses and therefore reduce the num-
ber of injured parties to whom compensation is owed by manufac-
turers or whom society must support." A comparative fault act
that has the effect of reducing the amount of compensation owed
by the manufacturer of defective products without a parallel de-
crease in the number of injured persons does not reduce primary
55. Professor Richard Epstein has stated that the manufacturer of a defective product
that causes injuries does not have the responsibility to minimize all foreseeable misuses.
Epstein prefers to narrow the standard by which a product may be found defective by reduc-
ing liability on a fixed proportion basis for such events. See Epstein, Plaintiff's Conduct in
Products Liability Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division and Multiple Par-
ties, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 87, 101 (1979). Professor Twerski, however, has argued, quite per-
suasively, that the basic duty of th, manufacturer is to make his product safe. If it is not, it
is probable that it will injure someone. To prevent or reduce recovery is to negate the manu-
facturer's basic duty to make the product safe for negligent claimants as well as non-negli-
gent claimants. Twerski, supra note 5, at 821 (1977). As has been stated by one court:
[Defendant] argues that a manufacturer cannot produce a product incapable of being
misused, mismounted, abused, or negligently maintained. But it does not follow from
these contentions that a manufacturer is under no duty to consider any of these factors
when he is adopting a design for his product.
Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 89, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301, 306 (1970). See
also Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
56. There is little doubt that the effect of strict liability for product related injuries is
to compensate for injuries that would not be compensated under the negligence system. The
goal of primary loss deterrence is to reduce the number of parties injured. The costs to soci-
ety of uncompensated but deterrable injuries from product use are a real although unat-
tributed cost of an inefficient system of primary loss deterrence.
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losses.5 1 It merely reduces the amount of compensation paid by the
producers of defective products. Uncompensated injury losses
caused by defective products are primary losses subsidized by indi-
vidual claimants or society. The gist of the argument behind the
use of claimant's fault to reduce or eliminate that claimant's recov-
ery is that greater care exercised by claimants will result in a re-
duction in total losses. In strict liability the manufacturer is "pay-
ing" only for the costs of those injuries caused, either in part or
totally, by those products which have been found to fall below es-
tablished standards. Therefore, there is little "justice" in a system
of strict liability for conscious design choices that requires the
manufacturer to compensate only partially for injuries caused by
the plaintiffs "unreasonable" use of a defective product, unless
this too will cause a reduction in primary losses.
The crux of the problem is the issue of whether the manufac-
turer has a duty to protect the consuming public from its own
"fault" by including safety devices, by warning claimants of risks
involved in the use of the product, or in adopting other design al-
ternatives. In Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.,58 the plain-
tiff, an eighteen year old native of Santa Domingo who spoke and
read no English, had four fingers amputated when his left hand
was drawn into a plastic pelletizing machine. The machine had
been manufactured with a bolted guard attachment that could be
removed in order to clean the machine when a change in the colors
of plastic being pelletized was made or when the machine was
jammed by a strand of plastic. Only the job foreman had the au-
thority or tools necessary to remove the guard. The plaintiff stated
that when he arrived at work on the night of the accident the guard
was not on the machine. When the guard was on the machine, the
plastic strands were introduced by a workman into the machine
through a horizontal opening in the guard that was too narrow to
admit a man's hand. The plaintiff introduced testimony that the
machine was "unsafely designed" when sold since it did not utilize
an interlock r* echanism to prevent operability when the guard was
not on the machine.59 Defendant's design engineer, while conceding
that interlocks were known well before the date of manufacture of
this machine, testified that their use was limited to hinged guards,
57. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 55, at 104.
58. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
59. The machine bad been manufactured twelve years before the plaintiff's injury.
Plaintiff's expert testified, however, that "interlocks" had been available since the turn of
the century. Id. at 166-67, 386 A.2d at 823.
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rather than those requiring the use of a wrench to remove.
The court first set forth the standard by which the product
would be measured in order to determine if it was defective for fail-
ure to include the guard. The court then proceeded to determine
the effect that the defendant's contention that the product was be-
ing abnormally used (since the plaintiff continued to operate the
machine, knowing the guard was not in place) should have upon
proof of liability for this conscious design choice. The intermediate
appellate court had found that such use negated proximate cause
as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case; therefore the
plaintiff could not recover." The Supreme Court of New Jersey
held, however, that the evidence of the frequent need to remove the
finger guard during operation imputed knowledge of the dangerous
potentiality of the conscious design choice to the manufacturer.
Central to the determination of liability was whether a "reasonably
prudent manufacturer" would have put the product into the
stream of commerce after considering the hazards as well as the
utility of the machine.'
Under strict liability for a product defective from a conscious
design choice, the manufacturer had the duty to consider the fore-
seeable consequences of using the pelletizing machine without the
guard. In theory, then, while the notion of foreseeability has defi-
nite overtones of traditional negligence liability, it is also appropri-
ately applied to a products liability action in which the manufac-
turer is held to a duty to protect against an unintended risk."2
Thus, the jury could conclude that a machine would be defective if
it was manufactured with a removable guard that would allow the
machine to be operated following the guard's removal.
The question of whether the plaintiff's use of the machine was
a defense, once the plaintiff established that the machine con-
tained an unreasonably dangerous defect which caused injury, was
also discussed by the Cepeda court. The court stated that the
plaintiff's conduct would be a defense if the plaintiff had unreason-
ably assumed a known risk. The court seems to be in error, how-
ever, since the duty of the manufacturer was to preclude that pos-
sibility by providing a machine that could not be operated without
a safety guard. Thus, under the doctrine of strict liability adopted
by the court in Cepeda, the duty of the manufacturer was to pro-
tect the plaintiff from his own "unreasonableness." Whether the
60. 138 N.J. Super. 344, 355, 351 A.2d 22, 27 (1976).
61. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163, 386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978).
62. Id. at 163, 386 A.2d at 821.
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manufacturer should be liable for such conduct is not at issue.
When the courts have declared that the manufacturer has a certain
duty that will assist in achieving primary loss reduction, considera-
tions that affect that duty should not interfere with its enforce-
ment. In such a case, when the plaintiff's actions consist of mere
unreasonable conduct, a manufacturer should remain fully liable
for injuries caused by a defective product that fails to meet soci-
ety's standards by being "unreasonably dangerous" through failure
to protect the claimant from the risks that product creates.6 3
By eliminating the proportionality of a comparative responsi-
bility statute, the primary issue of whether manufacturers should
have the duty to place safety devices upon equipment may be ad-
dressed. Thus, the plaintiff's exposure to a danger rendered by the
defective product should not be a defense if the defect in the prod-
uct was the failure of the manufacturer to protect the plaintiff from
exposing himself to that risk of injury. In Cepeda, the court quoted
with approval from Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.:4 "It
would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install
safety devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for
the very injury the duty was meant to protect against." 5 In
Cepeda, however, the court went on to find that the plaintiff was
unreasonable in assuming the risk of injury since the plaintiff knew
of the purpose of the guard, knew it was off, and knew that it could
be replaced by calling it to the attention of the job foreman. Valua-
ble court time was wasted establishing that a product was defective
even though the conduct of the person to be protected might fore-
close recovery for the injury that was to be protected."6 As the dis-
sent in Cepeda pointed out, the duty which was imposed upon the
manufacturer was the duty to produce a machine which would be
inoperable without a safety guard. If this duty had not been
breached, the plaintiff would not have suffered injury. The dissent
reasoned that relieving the manufacturer of the duty to place the
guard on the machine by permitting introduction of evidence that
the plaintiff had "unreasonably" used the defective product would
result in a limitation of the duty otherwise placed upon the manu-
facturer. The majority's position creates a schizophrenic situation
in which the manufacturer has only a limited duty to protect some-
one that the court has already stated the manufacturer has an ab-
63. Id. at 185, 386 A.2d at 832.
64. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
65. Id. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
66. 76 N.J. at 188, 386 A.2d at 839.
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solute duty to protect. If the duty of the manufacturer is to design
a machine that cannot be operated without a safety guard, then
the user's ability to protect himself is a wholly inadequate safe-
guard of those societal interests that this aspect of strict liability
was designed to insure. In this situation, then, the burden of avoid-
ing the risk of accidents has been placed solely upon the manufac-
turer. This determination reflects the conclusion that as the manu-
facturer is in the best position to limit total primary losses, a
plaintiff's conduct should not affect liability. As the Cepeda dis-
sent, referring to language reminiscent of Olson v. A.W. Chester-
ton," stated: "[Wihen the probability of the plaintiff's inadver-
tence is foreseeable and the manufacturer has the capacity to
guard against that contingency, he should not be released from his
duty toward plaintiff simply because the danger is obvious." 8
Cepeda stood for only one year before its premises were reviewed
by the court which rendered that decision.
In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,"" a decision
that promises to have far reaching impact, the effect of plaintiff's
fault on liability was reconsidered. The plaintiff in Suter was an
employee and part owner of a small industrial fabricator of sheet
metal products. The machine that injured the plaintiff was one
used to roll sheet steel into a cylindrical shape. The machine was
designed to operate so that, when the steel was rolled into a cylin-
der by means of two fifty-inch steel rollers, a latched drop arm
would permit the machine to be opened so that the completed cyl-
inder could be removed. The machine motor could be turned on
and off by means of a switch contained on a control box, which was
mounted on the machine's motor. The rollers in the machine were
not automatically activated by turning on the motor. Instead, the
machine's rollers were controlled after the motor was turned on by
means of a lever. The machine also contained a yellow treadle
switch that would deactivate the motor when depressed. When the
machine was in operation, the motor was normally left on and the
operator controlled the rollers by means of the lever. The plaintiff
was injured while in the process of loading the machine prior to re-
rolling a steel cylinder when he reached onto the steel cylinder to
remove an impurity and activated the rollers by brushing against
67. 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
68. 76 N.J. at 202, 386 A.2d at 841 (quoting Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not
Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1065, 1090 (1973)).
69. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
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the lever. Plaintiff was able to remove his hand only after it had
been severely injured.
At trial, plaintiff's expert testified that the machine was defec-
tively designed since the lever did not contain a rotary guard that
would prevent this form of accidental contact. Alternatively, the
plaintiff claimed that the machine was defective since the lever
should have been located on top of the gear housing away from the
area where it could be accidentally engaged. 0 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Schreiber,
who had written the dissent in Cepeda, acknowledged that the
plaintiff's conduct in the use of the machine might be relevant in
determining whether the product was defective. It is axiomatic that
if the defendant's product is used in a manner that was not in-
tended, and the use was so unforeseeable that the defendant had
no duty to warn against the risks of injury presented by such use,
then the manufacturer will not be liable to parties who use the
product in that manner and are injured. Consequently, plaintiffs
will be unable to prove that the product was defective. As the
Suter court noted: "[T]he manufacturer of a knife cannot be
charged with strict liability when the knife is used as a toothpick
and the user complains because the sharp edge cuts."7' As has been
noted elsewhere, many products liability cases that raise the ques-
tion of misuse actually involve the issue of whether or not the man-
ufacturer had a duty to design a product that would protect
against injuries due to that type of nonintended or abnormal
",use."72
If society imposes a duty upon the manufacturer to design a
product that will prevent injuries when the product is used in an
unintended fashion, then a plaintiff's injuries resulting from unin-
tended use are precisely the types of primary losses that the manu-
facturer has the obligation to prevent. This standard of care will
70. The court noted that this method had been in use when the defendant manufac-
tured and sold the machine. In addition, the National Safety Council had recommended the
use of bar guards as early as 1962. 406 A.2d at 143.
71. Id. at 144. Justice Clifford, concurring, amplified this statement by noting that:
If for instance, a plaintiff undertakes to use his power saw as a nail clipper and thereby
snips his digits he will not be heard to complain of the absence of a guard-not because
he is barred by any notion of contributory negligence but because the manufacturer has
no duty to protect against that type of use of his product. Likewise with respect, say, to
the man who decides to trim his beard with motorized hedge clippers not designed with
a protective device to avoid the unintended abbreviation of his nose. Outrageous exam-
ples to be sure, but they illustrate the principle.
Id. at 162-63.
72. See Twerski, supra note 55.
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approach absolute liability only when the manufacturer is held re-
sponsible for all injuries that result from the use of the product,
including uses that the manufacturer could not foresee. That liabil-
ity is, however, properly limited when the manufacturer's duty to
design (or manufacture) the product is circumscribed by an accu-
rate and understandable definition of defect. A definition that in-
volves the "reasonable expectations of the average consumer," or
uses an appropriate risk-benefit analysis to determine whether a
manufacturer had an obligation to protect against misuse, should
sufficiently limit the liability of the manufacturer and consequently
effect an acceptable reduction in the number of primary losses.
A plaintiff's conduct may, as the court in Suter maintained,
have an impact upon liability in the determination of whether a
"defect" in the product was the actual cause of the plaintiff's in-
jury. Consider, for example, a plaintiff with a surgical pin inserted
in his leg who is instructed not to walk upon the leg. If the plaintiff
nevertheless does walk upon the leg with a resultant stress failure
of the pin, he will not recover even though the pin was not as
strong as intended if a nondefective pin would also have failed.7 3
Thus, the Suter court points out another important limitation on
the plaintiff's cause of action for conscious design choice liability;
that is, the plaintiff must prove not only that the product was de-
fective at the time it left the manufacturer, but also that the defect
was a cause of the injury.
It is the Suter court's application of the principles of the New
Jersey Comparative Negligence Act that offers the most meaning-
ful hope for legitimate reform in this form of strict liability action.
The court noted that the plaintiff had used the machine thousands
of times and was totally conversant with its operation. The plain-
tiff knew that he could deactivate the machine by switching the
machine off or by stepping on the foot treadle prior to inserting his
hand. Such conduct would not be a defense under the Cepeda ra-
tionale, however, unless the plaintiff knew of the risks involved in
using the machine without shutting down the motor and nonethe-
less voluntarily encountered them.74 The anomaly is that in Cepeda
even careful operation of the machine without the safety guard
73. 406 A.2d at 144 (citing Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hosp., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 599, 321
N.W.2d 428 (1974)).
74. The court noted, however, that the rationale of Cepeda might permit sending the
issue of the plaintiff's conduct to the jury. Plaintiff's familiarity with and knowledge of the
deactivation procedure for the machine might support a contention that he was aware of the
risks yet voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself to them. 406 A.2d at n.4, 147-48.
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might have totally or proportionally barred recovery, whereas in
Suter the plaintiff, although careless, might not be barred or lim-
ited in his recovery.
The responsibility of the manufacturer to manufacture a non-
defective product should cause the same results whether that re-
sponsibility is to prevent a claimant from coming into contact with
dangerous machine parts or to prevent a claimant from acciden-
tally setting a dangerous machine in motion. Although the risk in
the first instance is that a claimant who knows the machine is on
will get his hands caught in the machine, while in the- second, the
risk is that the machine will start, thereby catching the claimant's
hands, the consequences are the same. Often, as the Suter court
stated, an employee engaged in an assigned task at his machine
has no meaningful choice whether or not to encounter a possible
risk. Therefore, as a matter of policy, even though it may be con-
tended that the employee voluntarily and unreasonably encoun-
tered a known risk, that conduct should not be a defense. This ar-
gument draws support from the majority position in Suter:
The imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to make the machine safe
to operate whether by installing a guard, or as in Cepeda, by making it in-
operable without a guard, means that the law does not accept the employee's
ability to take care of himself as an adequate safeguard of interests which
society seeks to protect .... The defendant manufacturer should not be per-
mitted to escape from the breach of its duty to an employee while carrying
out his assigned task under these circumstances when observance of that duty
would have prevented the very accident which occurred2
The court concluded that since the plaintiff's conduct did not con-
stitute a defense to the action, the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence could not apply. The Suter court left unanswered the ques-
tion whether comparative responsibility should ever be applied to
an action for injuries caused by a conscious design choice.
IV. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND PRIMARY Loss DETERRENCE
The Suter court recognized that a conscious design choice case
presents questions that relate to the wisdom of the manufacturer's
conduct notwithstanding that the focus is upon the product itself.
Indeed, in determining whether a product is used in a foreseeable
fashion so that the doctrine of foreseeable misuse will not abrogate
the manufacturer's liability, the question put to the fact finder is
one directly related to the conduct of the manufacturer. Strict lia-
bility has as one of its goals the reduction of primary accident costs
75. Id. at 148.
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by deterrence. Not all injuries will be compensated. Compensation
is awarded only when product defect and causation are proved.
Therefore, at the policy level a determination must be made of who
should bear the cost of compensation for those injuries when com-
pensation is awarded. Ideally, liability will be assessed against
those parties that are in the best position to prevent injuries.
Clearly, the manufacturer is in the best position not only to judge
whether foreseeable accident costs will exceed avoidance costs but
also to act upon that judgment. Unanswered is whether a claimant
might also be deterred from negligent injury-causing courses of
conduct.
The major criticism of disregarding the plaintiff's fault in de-
termining ultimate liability for the use of a defective product is
that the claimant might exercise a degree of care that he would not
otherwise exercise if he were aware that his recovery would be re-
duced by the percentage of his own fault. 6 Indeed, commentators
such as Professor Epstein have argued that legal incentives that
reduce the plaintiff's recovery may actually deter potential claim-
ants from engaging in dangerous conduct." Citing as an example
evidence that the reduction of the traffic speed limit to fifty-five
miles per hour had led to fewer traffic fatalities, Professor Epstein
stated that "[i]f individual drivers were held adequately in check
by fear for their own lives, then it would be ironic to assume that
the threat of a small fine, coupled with a possible increase in insur-
ance rates, or the suspension of a license would have much influ-
ence upon their behavior."7 8
Epstein concludes that a system of comparative fault that
reduces a careless plaintiff's recovery will provide the legal incen-
tives necessary to deter certain forms of human conduct even when
life and limb are imperiled.79 Epstein's assumption in the context
of reduced speed limits is that although it is ironic to assume that
individual drivers, not restrained by fear for their own lives, would
be deterred by the threat of a small fine or an increase in insurance
76. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 33.
77. Epstein, supra note 55, at 103-04. Professor Twerski agrees that some deterrence
value is presented by penalizing a plaintiff for the "consequences" of his own conduct. Twer-
ski, supra note 55, at 805. It is the value of that deterrent effect, when weighed against the
costs of litigating those questions and the impact that these proportional reductions will
have upon the deterrent impact of manufacturers, that raises questions regarding its value
in a system whose goal is to reduce total primary losses.
78. Epstein, supra note 55, at 104.
79. It should be noted that Professor Epstein does not advocate a true system of com-
parative fault but rather a system of pro rata reduction based upon plaintiff fault. Id. at 104.
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rates, the marginal effect of those additional sanctions does in fact
have a deterrence value.
This analysis, however, ignores the obvious fact that establish-
ing the speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour sets a clearly defined
standard for the operator from which deviation is clear and the eco-
nomic consequences are both apparent and predictable. The eco-
nomic consequences follow a conscious decision to deviate from the
established standard. This is not so, however, when the plaintiff's
conduct in the context of a normal personal injury action is mea-
sured by the standard of the reasonably prudent persoji. It is espe-
cially difficult to apply such a rationale when the conduct defined
as contributory fault may be the only conduct that the plaintiff is
capable of achieving under the circumstances."
Indeed, Epstein's analysis may be read to support a conclusion
that plaintiff's fault should not constitute a defense to a strict
products liability action. To the extent that the decision to exceed
the speed limit is made consciously, the individual is making a
conscious choice with obvious economic consequences for deviation
from the established standard. While the risk of deviation may in-
clude an increased risk of personal harm, the primary deterrent in
this form of conscious deviation is economic since the risk of loss is
clear and predictable. The operator of the vehicle is in a position to
make that conscious choice. It is, however, disingenuous to suggest
that the average user of a product will be more effectively deterred
by speculative and unpredictable economic consequences in a sub-
sequent tort action than by the immediate risk of personal harm.
Those drivers that would not exceed the speed limit would also op-
erate machinery in a safe fashion. Their incentive, however, would
be protection from injury rather than a decrease in financial loss.
If, however, the risks of loss created by a product design were con-
sidered and accepted by the manufacturer in the design process
and those products are later held unreasonably dangerous, then in
the interests of reducing total primary losses the individual claim-
ant's fault should not be considered separately. The only risk that
the manufacturer has in an unsafely designed product is a risk of
financial loss."1
S0. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF TRA.SP., DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT: IM-
PUCATIONS FOR TORT L BmLY 151-69 (1970).
81. I am not unaware of the "risk" of criminal prosecution as evidenced by the prose-
cution of the Ford Motor Company for design defect in Pulaski County, Indiana. It is to be
noted, however, that while a corporation may be tried and convicted of a crime in some
jurisdictions, the penalty is exclusively financial. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-
3(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
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The product liability action also presents the question of how
to appropriately allocate secondary loss. In the conscious design de-
fect situation, the manufacturer has made a conscious economic
decision to manufacture and market a product that falls below the
minimum standard society has set for that product. As between the
manufacturer of the product and the injured claimant, the manu-
facturer is in the best position to undertake the cost-benefit analy-
sis necessary to arrive at a decision whether to manufacture a prod-
uct that contains a conscious design choice defect. The
manufacturer is also in the best position to spread the costs of com-
pensation for those injuries as well as to control the number of "de-
fects" contained in products that are placed into the stream of
commerce. 2
Where the defect alleged is a manufacturing flaw or an objec-
tive design defect, defenses based upon the plaintiff's conduct may
be considered since the manufacturer has only imputed rather than
actual knowledge of defect. Thus, the manufacturing flaw and ob-
jective design choice cases represent true examples of strict liabil-
ity. If the cause of action is based upon a conscious design choice,
however, the plaintiff's conduct should not be considered. That
case represents a situation in which the issue at trial is the "con-
duct" of the manufacturer in accepting a potentially dangerous de-
sign that falls below the standard set for that product. In the
manufacturing flaw and objective design defect cases, the princi-
ples of risk-benefit analysis are not present. The manufacturer's
"fault" may be established in those cases regardless of his conduct
if the finished product is deemed to have been defective and the
manufacturer has engaged in marketing the product. The conscious
design choice case, however, sets forth quite a different case, and
different considerations apply. In conscious design choice cases the
manufacturer is deemed to have made a conscious choice, after
evaluating the risks, to create a product which falls below the stan-
dard set for that type of product. While the analysis the jury un-
82. As Justice Pomeroy, concurring in McCown v. International Harvester Co., 342
A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975), stated, "It is a proper corollary to this principle that the lesser loss-
bearing capacity of product users exists independently of their negligence or lack of it." Id.
at 383. Dean Wade has suggested that allowing a negligent claimant to receive compensation
for injuries suffered by a defective product will force innocent users to bear the costs of
compensation. Wade, supra note 1, at 379 (citing Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d
359, 377, 551 P.2d 398, 405, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting)). The issue
upon which I would focus, however, is not only the right of the users who are injured by the
defective products to expect compensation, but also the salutary effects upon total product
safety of liability costs when a defective product has caused injury to a claimant.
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dertakes to determine whether a product embodies a conscious de-
sign choice is not totally free from criticism, this does not justify
reducing the claimant's recovery when the manufacturer's choice
renders a product defective.
If reform in products liability litigation is to come, that reform
should be made either by legitimatizing the products liability
cause of action or by seeking alternative forms of compensation for
product related injuries. The purpose of a judgment in a products
liability action should be in part to deter future conduct. The im-
perfections that have crept into products liability law, especially in
the conscious design choice area, cannot be expected to be reme-
died by simple modification of the percentages of recovery availa-
ble to claimants. If reform is to come, it must be consistent with
the policies and social goals that are sought to be achieved in a tort
system.
Gearing up the very cumbersome tort litigation liability ma-
chinery, in which over fifty percent 3 of the insurance premium dol-
lar is spent on administrative costs, to analyze a conscious design
choice can be justified only if there is some deterrent value in as-
sessing financial liability. Other types of defect are easily proven
by comparison and therefore represent different considerations. If
there is reduced deterrent value in conscious design choice litiga-
tion, a simpler, more efficient system of compensating injured par-
ties must be proposed for all product related injuries. If the basis of
the attack is on the size of lump sum jury awards, then reform
should be in the nature of a periodic compensation plan for product
caused injuries. If the nature of what is being compensated is at
issue, then the nature and role of damages should be reviewed.
Comparative responsibility has been used by some courts that are
troubled by difficult questions of causation or by the failure to
draft an adequate definition of product "defect." This proportional
system has permitted a resolution of the difficulty by allowing
neither plaintiff nor manufacturer an adequate remedy. To say
that juries are competent to perform the difficult percentage alloca-
83. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIL-
ITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 2-1 (1977).
84. In a well-reasoned approach to the question of plaintiff's fault in negligence as well
as strict liability actions, Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has suggested that plaintiff's fault be
eliminated and the collateral source rule abolished. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Con-
tributory and Comparative Fault with Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collat-
eral Source Rule, 1979 ILL. L. FORUM 591 (1979). Professor O'Connell's position is well
thought out and documented, but goes further than this author would by advocating the
elimination of all considerations of plaintiff fault.
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tions required in a strict liability action based upon a conscious
design choice when plaintiff's percentage of responsibility is to be
considered is disingenuous. It is like praising Alexander for cutting
the Gordian knot when he was asked to "untie" it. It has at best
removed or weakened the pressure for actual reform. A compara-
tive responsibility rule that responds to the demands of an organ-
ized and highly vocal minority ignores the needs of injured con-
sumers who remain ubiquitous and disorganized.
V. CONCLUSION
The varieties of product defect permit different conclusions re-
garding whether plaintiff's conduct should constitute a defense to a
manufacturer's liability. Those cases of product liability based
upon allegations of manufacturing flaw or objective design defect
may be treated as true forms of strict liability. Therefore, tradi-
tional negligence analysis may be utilized to establish a standard
from which deviation constitutes a basis for a cause of action for
injuries. In such cases, primary loss reduction may be effected
through imposition of liability for all product-daused injuries sub-
ject to consideration of the conduct of the plaintiff. The primary
justification for strict liability in these cases is the superior secon-
dary loss distribution capability of the manufacturer of defective
products.
Strict liability for conscious design choice, however, has at its
base a more substantial foundation in primary loss deterrence. If
the acts which constitute a defense in conscious design choice liti-
gation are acts of a claimant that the manufacturer was expected
to consider and protect against in the selection of design choice, it
is not in the interests of the goal of primary loss limitation to per-
mit foreseeable user conduct to constitute a defense to the action.
Eliminating all consideration of the plaintiff's fault as a fur-
ther defense in conscious design choice litigation will permit con-
centration upon elimination of primary losses through the imposi-
tion of liability upon those parties who can best bear the burden of
compensating for losses, thereby satisfying secondary loss distribu-
tion principles as well. To the extent that proportional systems of
loss distribution between claimants and defendants decrease the
intensity of the need for exploring alternative methods of compen-
sating for and eliminating product caused injuries, such partial
"reforms" are inconsistent with progress as well as the dual goals of
tort liability.
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